Israel’s limited missile attack on Iran could be the beginning of a broader attack

AFTER DECADES of shadow war between the Jewish State and the Islamic Republic, Israel launched its first officially recognized attack on Iran in the early morning hours of October 26. Dozens of warplanes flying at least 1,300 km from their bases in Israel fired missiles against air defense facilities and missile factories in three Iranian provinces, including on the outskirts of the capital, Tehran.

It is a measure of the sky-high level of tension in the Middle East that Israel’s chosen targets, which were purely military in nature, were seen as some of the more limited options. Since Iran fired 181 ballistic missiles against Israel on October 1, officials close to Benjamin Netanyahu have questioned the Israeli prime minister’s view that a “historic opportunity” has opened up to deal a strategic blow to Iran.

Instead, Israel mainly struck Iran’s S-300 air defense radars and Russian-made missile launchers, bypassing its nuclear facilities. The Israelis also did not destroy key economic targets, such as oil export terminals. This suggests that Israel is, for once, taking into account pressure from its American ally. It may also suggest that Israel is preparing the ground for another, much more devastating attack.

The key to understanding Israel’s decision is the American political calendar. With the American presidential election just ten days away, Israel had a choice: retaliate against military targets, with America’s tacit blessing, or defy President Joe Biden’s explicit warnings not to attack nuclear or energy facilities on the eve of the vote. The latter would threaten future cooperation with the Democratic administration if Kamala Harris wins on November 5. If Donald Trump, who has already expressed his support for an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear program, wins, there is always a chance for future strikes.

How effective were the Israeli attacks? There is too little evidence so far to be sure. Israeli officers say they have destroyed most of Iran’s advanced air defense capabilities and, as a result, their air forces can operate freely in Iranian airspace. If this is true, it means that a future Israeli attack could be much more extensive.

According to Israeli security sources, this time most of the targets were hit by air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) fired from aircraft well beyond the range of Iran’s defenses. Israel’s stockpile of ALBMs is limited, and a more intense airstrike campaign against Iran would require large numbers of jets using shorter-range munitions. If Israel’s claims regarding this strike are true, it is now possible. It will take many months for Iran to rebuild its air defenses, especially when its Russian suppliers will need their own batteries for the war with Ukraine.

Iran still has a large number of missiles and drones and could launch a third attack on Israel. But it is unlikely to rush into such a move. Not only would this risk provoking a much more damaging Israeli counterattack, but Iran’s leaders are also closely watching the American elections. The overriding concern of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the stability of his regime. Each course of action – attacking Israel again or keeping fire – carries risks. For the first time since the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, Tehran’s residents witnessed a military attack on their city. Lack of reaction will be perceived as a sign of weakness.

However, retaliation can have devastating consequences. In this attack, Israel could have destroyed one of Iran’s most important lines of defense: the S-300 batteries. It has already significantly reduced the protection provided by the missile arsenal that Iran has provided to Hezbollah, the Shiite militia in Lebanon, as a threat to Israel. Most of Iran’s precision-guided missiles were destroyed in recent Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.

At least for now, Iran is trying to downplay the Israeli attack; its semi-official Tasnim news agency described Israel’s claims as “complete lies” and said only “limited damage” had been done. Tehran will almost certainly wait before deciding whether and how to respond.

There are also domestic implications for Netanyahu. After raising expectations, his political rivals are already blaming him for wasting the opportunity. Before the strike, Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister and future right-wing challenger, urged the government to “destroy Iran’s nuclear program.” Yair Lapid, the centrist opposition leader, said that “the decision not to attack strategic and economic targets was wrong.”

This time, Netanyahu has decided to exercise strategic patience, at least for now. But if he is willing to pay a political price for choosing a more measured course of action against Iran, it will almost certainly mean that Israel is at war on other fronts – in Gaza and Lebanon – and will be less susceptible to pressure for a ceasefire. Add to that pressure from his far-right allies, who have the power to overthrow his government during the next session of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, which begins on October 27, and any cessation of Israel’s other wars seems less likely.

The nature of this strike on Iran seems to show that if America wants to exert serious pressure, it can still shape Israeli policy. Israel has repeatedly escalated fighting in Gaza and Lebanon this year, despite the Biden administration’s urging. This time it has acted in full coordination, so far avoiding a move that could trigger both a regional conflagration and a global spike in energy prices. However, there is a risk that this attack was only a prelude to a more serious attack that was to follow.

From The Economist, published under license. Original content can be found at www.economist.com